



Perhaps I can do no better in introducing this Colloquium on
legislative and administrative motivation in constitutional law
than to begin with the letter I sent those who had agreed to au-
thor lead articles and responses. In this letter I noted that the
Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis' and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.2 had re-
opened the issue of legislative motive that it presumably had bur-
ied in United States v. O'Brien3 and Palmer v. Thompson.4 It was
therefore appropriate for constitutional scholars to attempt to de-
velop a complete theory of motivational inquiry in constitutional
law. Such a theory would have to attempt at some point to answer
the following obviously interrelated questions: (1) To which con-
stitutional provisions and issues are legislative and administrative
motivation relevant? (2) What is the rationale for focusing upon
motivation as opposed to, or in addition to, effect? (3) What is the
effect of finding particular motives upon the question of constitu-
tionality? Do particular motives trigger review of effects or do
they preclude it? (4) Is the relevant level of the legislator's or the
administrator's motivation his ultimate motivation, his intermedi-
ate motivation (which he conceives of as a means to his ultimate
motivation), or some other level of motivation? (5) Is the relevant
strength of motivation the primary motivation, the "but for" moti-
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. BA., Williams College, 1965;
LL.B., Yale Law School, 1968.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. 429 U.S. 252 (1976).
3. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
4. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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vation, or some other strength of motivation? (6) Should one clas-
sify as permissible, impermissible, or mandated such various
motivations as disadvantaging blacks, separating races, pleasing
one's constituents, logrolling, making a name in history, following
a Benthamite utilitarian calculus, and suppressing certain views
for the long-range general welfare? (7) How should one deal with
the conceptual problems-such as problems of motivation behind
opposing votes, abstentions, executive vetoes or approvals, and
votes in referenda-in attributing "motives" to collective bodies?
(8) How should one deal with the problems of legislative and ad-
ministrative inaction, failure to propose, failure to repeal, old
law/new motives, and so forth? (9) What evidence of motivation
will be admissible, what burdens of proof and of going forward
will obtain, and how will the doctrines of res judicata and stare
decisis apply to decisions based upon motivations? (10) Is motiva-
tion relevant to the legislator or to the administrator himself, but
irrelevant or less relevant to the judiciary? (11) Finally, what are
the history and current state of the law on these issues? The let-
ter concluded by noting that any serious scholar owes a huge debt
of gratitude to Professors John Ely5 and Paul Brest 6 for their
groundbreaking work on most of these questions.
Those who read the contributions to this Colloquium probably
will agree that although a complete theory of motivation inquiry,
around which all will rally, as yet does not exist-and probably
never will eist-scholars have at least a better idea than before
about the shape such a theory might take, the difficulties with
which its proponents must contend, and the moves they might
make to cope with these difficulties. The theories offered by the
two lead authors-Professor Larry Simon7 of the University of
Southern California, and Professor Morris Clark8 of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota-surely have deepened our understanding of
what is entailed in relating motivation to constitutionality.
5. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
6. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95.
7. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of
the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041
(1978).
8. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAn DINGO L REV. 953 (1978).
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A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MOTIVATION/EFFECTS PROBLEM
Effects Theories of Constitutional Law
The problems of motivation inquiry might be best understood
by first examining a theory of constitutional law in which the only
inquiry relevant to the constitutionality of rules or decisions is an
inquiry into their effects. 9 Transgression of any constitutional lim-
itation consists in producing, or being likely to produce, certain
prohibited states of affairs. The prohibited states of affairs may be
very specific-for example, a presidential term other than four
years-or they may be very general-for example, states of affairs
violating Rawls's two principles of justice,10 Nozick's individual
rights," Bentham's principle of aggregative utilitarianism, 2 or
whichever other set of abstract principles or rights one might pre-
fer to serve as the objective meaning of "equal protection," "due
process," or other provision.'3 Whatever the prohibited state of af-
fairs, its production by the rule in question, not the motive behind
the rule, is both necessary and sufficient for unconstitutionality.14
Motive (the "why" of the rule) of course will influence the mean-
ing of the rule ("what" was done) and thereby be related to the
effects, or the states of affairs, produced by the rule.'5 However,
ultimately only effects matter, not motives. Legislators desiring to
produce forbidden effects and to avoid mandated ones may be vi-
olating their oaths. Nonetheless, their official acts may be im-
mune from impeachment if the effects of these acts turn out to be
either mandated or permissible.
Formidable difficulties face any theory of constitutional law
grounded solely on certain mandated or prohibited effects. First,
9. From this point forward, the term "rule" stands for both legislative and ad-
ministrative rules and for decisions by officials in particular cases. The phrase
"legislative motive" refers both to the motive of collective bodies such as legisla-
tures and some administrative agencies and to the motive of individual officials.
10. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
11. R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
12. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIs-
LATION (1789).
13. Owen Fiss adopts the well-chosen phrase "mediating principle" to stand for
such a set of abstract principles or rights. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 107-08 (1976).
14. One consequence of holding that certain states of affairs are what violate
the Constitution is that it is usually not the effects of only one law, but the com-
bined effects of the entire set of laws in a jurisdiction, which are unconstitutional.
15. Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83
HIARv. L. REV. 1887 (1970).
it is notoriously difficult to generate any consensus under the
most important constitutional clauses about which specific ef-
fects are relevant and why they are relevant. What kinds of ine-
qualities suffered by individuals violate equal protection?
Inequalities violating the basic tenets of some general normative
theory which formed the Framers' root concept16 of equal protec-
tion, such as proposed by Rawls, Nozick, or Bentham? Or inequal-
ities violating a more specific and limited principle, such as all
inequalities produced by laws classifying on the basis of race,
even if a few of these inequalities can be justified under a broader
theory which the Framers might have held and which is usually,
but not always, consistent with banning racial classifications? Dis-
agreements about the identity and the proper level of generality
of the root principles of equal protection, due process, freedom of
speech and religion, and other clauses are as prevalent now as
they ever have been.17
A second difficulty faced by a pure effects theory arises when-
ever the theory itself or, for institutional reasons, the judiciary
permits two or more inconsistent effects.18 Assume, for example,
that a range of effects, from those produced by libertarian princi-
ples to those produced by egalitarian ones, is permissible under
the relevant constitutional provision. The effects not permissible
include those produced by a rule such as "Laissez-faire capitalism
for blacks, wealth redistribution for whites." Now suppose a legis-
lative body is faced with the issue of whether to open public
swimming pools. Neither the pools (a concession to redistributive
notions) nor their absence is constitutionally compelled or forbid-
den. One day only whites desire to swim, and the legislative body
opens the pools. The next day only blacks desire to swim, and the
legislative body closes the pools. Whites and blacks continue de-
siring to swim on alternate days, and the legislative body contin-
ues to open the pools on the days when whites desire to swim and
16. On the distinction between basic concepts and specific conceptions, and the
distinction's relevance to constitutional law, see Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of
Richard Nixon, N.Y. Rv. BooKs, May 4, 1972, at 27.
17. See, e.g., the works cited in Alexander, The Province of Constitutional Law
Casebook Jurisprudence Redetermined, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1306 n.25 (1977). See
also these more recent works: R. Dwomw, TAKING RIoHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); D.
Ric, ADs, TnE MORAL CrrlcIsm OF LAw (1977); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Im-
pact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L REV.
36 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1162 (1977).
18. The '"ight/privilege" distinction in constitutional law may reflect a range of
effects within which the Constitution permits legislative choice, or it may reflect
judicial inability to identify the constitutionally mandated effects within that
range.
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close the pools on the days when blacks desire to swim. The rule
existing at any particular moment is by hypothesis constitutional.
Yet the effects are no different from those produced by the un-
constitutional rule, "Public pools for whites only." The legislative
body may in fact be covertly following this rule, or meta-rule. Un-
less a supplemental freezing principle requires the legislative
body to continue with the libertarian or the egalitarian principles
first chosen,' 9 a reviewing court must either uphold each of the
actions or examine the motive to determine whether the legisla-
tive body is continually changing its mind about the desirability
of redistributive services or instead is consistently following an
impermissible, covert meta-rule.
20
An effects theory may also allow a range of inconsistent effects
because it dictates only that certain decisionmaking procedures
be followed and, within a range, attaches no consequences to the
19. Of course, some freezing principles protecting individuals against shifts in
governmental policy are embodied in the Constitution. A shift may be deemed a
"taking" proscribed by the fifth amendment or by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment; it may be deemed an impairment of the obligations of con-
tracts, proscribed by art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (and, with respect to the federal government,
either the takings clause or the due process clause of the fifth amendment); it may
simply be deemed egregiously unfair retroactive legislation violative of due proc-
ess; or it may be deemed an ex post facto criminal law. Perhaps some changes of
rules will even be deemed violative of equal protection solely for treating persons
in the present differently from the way persons were treated in the past. However,
a legislature generally is not precluded from changing the rules, even if the earlier
rules promise by their terms to last for a certain period or even forever,
20. This problem arises because of the absence of a freezing principle and be-
cause the constitutionality of a rule is rarely the product of its effects at any one
instant, but is most often the product of the effects it is predicted to have over
time if it persists. For example, an effects account of the unconstitutionality of a
law closing a section of beach to blacks is not the product of its effects at midnight
when no one, black or white, desires to use the beach. Similarly, an effects ac-
count of the unconstitutionality of a law forbidding abortions is not the product of
its effects on March 3, when no one is seeking an abortion. If the legislature does
not intend for the rule to persist because the legislature is following a covert meta-
rule dictating that the overt rule be changed under certain circumstances, the ef-
fects of the overt rule cannot be predicted without knowing the meta-rule. In a
sense, the true rule, the effects of which are constitutionally relevant, is the meta-
rule, and the overt rule is a "decision" under it much like an ad hoc administrative
or judicial decision or a decision under an overt rule. The meta-rule, not the overt
rule, is the true criterion of decision, and the effects of true criteria of decision are
the relevant effects in an effects theory. (This explanation should clear up much
of the confusion about whether administrative discrimination must be purposeful
to be violative of equal protection.) Thus, one can maintain that motive is relevant
in an effects theory in these circumstances only because "What" was done, the ef-
fects of which are in issue, coalesces completely with "why" it was done-the mo-
tive or covert meta-rule.
further effects produced by such procedures. A theory may re-
quire or permit a jury to be selected at random rather than re-
quire its members to have particular attributes. The "effect"
required by the theory is a certain selection process; this process
itself must be examined under the theory.
21
Moreover, even where an effects theory requires one particular
state of affairs to be produced, the judiciary may be reluctant to
attempt to discern which of several different rules produces this
state of affairs. It may be reluctant because the matter is one re-
quiring complex factual assessments which the legislative body is
better equipped to make. Furthermore, ordinarily no reason ex-
ists to suspect that the legislative body was motivated other than
to produce the required state of affairs, and decisions by legisla-
tive bodies are, for reasons of dignity and efficiency, owed some
presumption of regularity by the courts. However, when the sus-
picion of improper motivation becomes strong enough, the courts
under an effects theory would be warranted in invalidating a rule
unless it were demonstrated to be the rule necessary to produce
the mandated effects. 2 2
21. This is basically the role of motive inquiry in Professor Ely's theory. Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970).
Of course, in one sense all motive theories can be viewed simply as special
types of effects theories because the relevant effects are decisionmaking
processes and reasons for decisions. Moreover, concern with these "effects" usu-
ally stems from concern with the further social effects they produce. In other
words, concerns with decisionmaking procedures and motives are usually con-
cerns with the outcomes and with the byproducts of such procedures and motives
(though not always, as the jury-selection example shows). These concerns are
usually with what Rawls calls "perfect procedural justice" and "imperfect proce-
dural justice." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-86 (1971). They are not usually
concerns with the procedure or with the motives as ends in themselves, what
Rawls calls "pure procedural justice." Id. at 86. However, the motive theorist em-
phasizes the decisionmaking process even when the effects beyond the process
are benign. The effects theorist emphasizes the results beyond the process.
22. One problem at this point is what to do with similar rules enacted in other
jurisdictions by well-intentioned legislatures. The court has found a suspect mo-
tive behind a rule to which it normally would grant a strong presumption of valid-
ity. It has engaged in a strict review of the rule's effects and has found that the
government has not shown that the constitutionally mandated effects are pro-
duced. Theoretically, all similar rules with similar predicted effects should now be
invalidated despite having been enacted with proper motives, even though had
none of the rules been the product of a suspect motive they all would have been
sustained under minimum scrutiny. The situation is comparable to one in which
several juries (analogous to several different governmental bodies) render similar
verdicts in the same lawsuit (analogous to similar rules). Presumably a correct
verdict exists (analogous to the constitutionally mandated set of effects), which
these juries either did or did not reach. The existence of evidence legally sufficient
to support the verdict reached (analogous to the evidence required to survive min-
imum review) is assumed. However, one jury is discovered to have been biased
against the losing party. The court might throw out that one verdict, except that
several other unbiased juries have reached the same verdict. Alternatively, the
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Motivation Theories of Constitutional Law
To this point, I have been discussing effects theories of consti-
tutionality and the role of motivation within them. Basically, the
effects theory uses motive only as evidence of effects.23 A motiva-
tion theory begins with a set of mandated or proscribed motives.
The set undoubtedly is selected because of the social effects asso-
ciated with it,24 and the presence of motives within the set is
proved primarily through the effects of rules and decisions. How-
ever, in the final analysis, where motives and effects are inconsis-
tent, the motives, not the effects, govern.
How one decides the following hypothetical provides a simple,
litmus-paper test for whether one holds an effects or a motive
theory. Suppose a city passes an ordinance prohibiting the burn-
ing of American flags on the sidewalks and streets.2 5 Suppose in
addition that the ordinance was passed by a terribly benighted
city council which believed that the only objects flammable on
sidewalks and streets were American flags. Rather than frame the
ordinance as "Don't burn flammable objects," the city council de-
cided to give further guidance to those who might not "know" that
only American flags burn. How would effects and motive theorists
view this ordinance?
The effects theorist, assuming he holds an orthodox view of
which effects are important under the first amendment, probably
court might reach its own verdict (strict review), in which case it makes no sense
to allow any verdict other than its own to stand.
Perhaps a court should not permanently invalidate the rule because of the sus-
pect motive but should invalidate it pending reenactment with proper motives.
This action would salvage the similar rules enacted by other governmental bodies.
The motive theorist would have no problem in such a case. He would not care
that the effects of all the rules were the same (other than those effects produced
by public awareness of the underlying motives), because only motives are im-
portant, and the motives behind the rule in question are materially different from
the motives behind the other rules.
23. This statement is true if one includes among the allowed or the mandated
effects certain decisionmaking procedures, such as random selection, which are
deemed appropriate for certain kinds of decisions.
24. In other words, constitutional law ultimately is not concerned with passing
judgment on legislators or administrators. It is concerned with social effects.
25. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). I select this e~kample because it
represents an area of constitutional law where principles of equality and princi-
ples governing clauses other than the equal protection clause are said to merge.
See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 20
(1975). See also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
would conclude that because things other than American flags are
flammable, the ordinance produces, or creates the potential for
producing, an unnecessarily disproportionate harm to those politi-
cal messages associated with burning American flags (presuma-
bly an improper effect under his theory).26 He would consider the
ordinance constitutionally defective from the moment it was
passed. Therefore, he would consider warranted both an injunc-
tion and damages for past injury from the ordinance.2
7
The motive theorist would view the ordinance differently. He
would consider the ordinance valid at the time of enactment be-
cause the motive behind the ordinance was to prevent public con-
flagrations (presumably proper under his theory), not to suppress
speech (presumably improper).28 Of course, when the suit chal-
lenging the ordinance is brought, if not sooner, the city council
will be made aware of its factual error. Failure to repeal the ordi-
nance thus would be suspect and would provide grounds for an
injunction or for declaratory relief.29 However, i1o damages should
lie for the period during which the city council remained igno-
rant.30
26. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cin. L. REv. 20 (1975).
As I have pointed out in another article, however, even a law not over- or under-
inclusive with respect, for example, to flammable objects may disproportionately
burden some political messages-namely, those which more often are expressed
through burning objects. Alexander, Speech in the Local Marketplace: Implica-
tions of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. for Local Regulatory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 357, 370-73 n.49 (1977). See
also Clark, supra note 8, at 1010.
27. Justice Fortas, dissenting in Street, argued that because a law banning the
burning of all objects on the streets and sidewalks would be constitutional, a law
banning the burning of only some objects should be constitutional. His argument
is fallacious and would undermine the pure equal protection principles found in
the equal protection clause, the first amendment, and elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion, unless he meant that it is constitutionally mandatory for governments to out-
law burning objects in public. Moreover, even if it were mandatory, Street should
have been given relief as a reward for calling attention to the under-inclusiveness
of the ordinance. This point is relevant in all cases in which a party identifies an
unconstitutional inequality, and the legislative response to invalidation will most
likely be, or is constitutionally required to be, an extension of the burden (or con-
traction of the benefit) to others.
28. In other words, the ordinance is considered valid when enacted, unless the
motive theorist also holds that legislative mistakes in addition to improper mo-
tives invalidate their product. Clark and Simon appear to hold such a position,
which has the potential for invalidating a considerable number of rules. Clark,
supra note 8, at 983-84; Simon, supra note 7, at 1113-14. See also text accompany-
ing note 58 infra.
29. This conclusion assumes, of course, that the term "American flag" in the or-
dinance will be given its standard meaning rather than a functional one reflecting
the council's original motive.
30. See Simon, supra note 7, at 1074, 1121, 1126-27. Perhaps this point overstates
the remedial differences between effects and motivation theories. First, in prac-
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Relevant Motives in Both Effects and Motive Theories
Effects Theories
Any theory in which motive is relevant to constitutionality
must, of course, specify which motives are relevant and why they
are relevant. In an effects theory permitting a range of inconsis-
tent effects, a legislative motive to follow an impermissible meta-
rule and produce an impermissible effect over time by having the
legislature move if necessary among permissible but inconsistent
rules3 ' should be considered grounds for invalidation regardless
of whether the motive is ultimate or intermediate. That is, such a
motive should be grounds for invalidation so long as it, or the ulti-
mate motive to which it is intermediate, is causally sufficient.3
2
Similarly, when a required or permissible "effect" consists of a
tice, rules producing improper effects and rules enacted with improper motives
generally will be linked. Second, under some effects theories, especially those
based on consequentialist principles like act-utilitarianism or Rawls's Difference
Principle, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSnCE 75, 302 (1971), it may not be true that
one should award damages or should otherwise restore the status quo ante be-
cause of the past enforcement of rules violative of these principles. In other words,
even though a rule was and still is unconstitutional because it violates consequen-
tialist principles, providing remedies for those who have been subjected to the
rule may violate the same consequentialist principles. This point illustrates the
problematic character of "rights" purporting to be derived from consequentialist
principles. It also diminishes the usefulness for the various retrospectiv-
ity/prospectivity problems in jurisprudence of distinctions between principles and
policies, so long as principles may be consequentialist. For positions relying on the
principle/policy distinction, see R. Dwoman, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977);
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
On the other hand, in motive theories not supplemented by a prohibition of mis-
takes, a rule enacted and not repealed for permissible purposes is constitutional
no matter what effects it has. A rule with untoward effects becomes unconstitu-
tional only when the legislature becomes aware of the bad effects. Yet one might
still ask what the motive is for not compensating persons subjected to the rule in
the past once the legislature becomes aware of the bad effects. If the relevant mo-
tive in the motive theory is the subjective counterpart to an effects principle war-
ranting retrospective compensation, no legitimate motive may be available for
failure to compensate, even though the rule was constitutional when applied to
the persons in question. Conversely, where the effects principle is forward-looking
and does not justify compensation for those subjected to the rule, neither would
the motive counterpart to the effects principle justify such compensation.
Where a law was enacted for improper motives but later was reenacted or not
repealed for proper motives, should damages lie for enforcement prior to the
change of motives?
31. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
32. An ultimate motive is the last answer the legislator gives to a series of
"whys?" addressed to his action. An intermediate motive is any answer preceding
the last. A causally sufficient motive is one the presence of which will produce the
action in question. A causally necessary motive is one the absence of which will
particular decisionmaking process (for example, choosing jurors
at random), circumvention of this process (choosing jurors other
than at random) will be grounds for invalidation if no other per-
missible effect (for example, a better-educated jury) is what is
aimed at as a permanent effect.33
When the effects theory itself mandates one state of affairs, but
the courts for reasons of institutional deference ordinarily do
not,34 motive is not relevant in itself, but only as a guide to the
beliefs and attitudes of the legislators and to the effects they were
attending to in their action. The presumption of constitutionality
should hold only to the extent these beliefs and attitudes warrant
confidence in the legislators' bringing about the mandated effects.
Indeed, all facts about the actual legislative process-including
facts about the actual evidence presented and the time taken for
deliberation, as well as facts about ultimate and intermediate mo-
tives-are relevant to the amount of deference due the action.
35
Once the court decides the presumption of constitutionality is un-
warranted, the court should then strictly scrutinize the rule or de-
cision to see if the rule or decision will bring about the mandated
effects. If the rule or decision will not, the court should declare
it invalid.36
Motive Theories
A motive theorist begins with a set of required or forbidden mo-
tives as the key to understanding particular constitutional com-
mands. Motives are, no doubt, deemed pivotal because of their
likely effects. 37 But they remain pivotal even in those circum-
stances where the rule or the decision will produce good effects
despite the proscribed motive. For example, if the Framers of the
preclude the action in question. The sufficient motive for enactment of a rule will
define a meta-rule behind the rule.
33. The phrase "aimed at as a permanent effect" is used because of the meta-
rule problem of moving among optional effects in order to produce impermissible
ones. See text accompanying notes 18-20 & 31-32 supra.
34. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
35. For an excellent discussion of judicial review of the legislative process in
constitutional law, see Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1162 (1977).
36. See note 22 supra for the stare decisis effect of such a declaration for simi-
lar rules enacted with proper motives.
37. There are probably hybrid theories between pure motive and effects theo-
ries which would count the social reaction to the perceived motive behind a rule
or decision as part of the relevant effects of the rule or decision. Part of both
Clark's and Simon's justification for the prohibition of racially prejudiced actions
is based on these kinds of effects. Clark, supra note 8, at 964-67; Simon, supra
note 7, at 1050-51. See also Brest, The Supreme Cour4 1975 Term-Foreword: In De-
fense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 1-I~v. L REv. 1, 6-12 (1976). However,
in reality such a theory is merely a very sophisticated effects theory if in the end
the effects of motives, and not the motives themselves, control.
[VOL 15: 925, 19781 Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
equal protection clause meant it to prohibit actions based on ra-
cial hostility because they felt such actions in most instances
would violate some more basic normative principle, the motive
theorist would call for invalidation of such actions even where,
because of changes in the social context or our understanding of
race, a particular instance of racial hostility was unlikely to con-
flict with the deeper normative principle. The prohibition of the
motive controls even in circumstances in which the principle giv-
ing rise to the prohibition would not warrant it. Similarly, motives
remain pivotal for a motive theorist where the rule or decision
will produce bad effects despite the presence of a required mo-
tive.
A motive theory may be either a theory of mandated motives or
a theory of proscribed motives, and it may be either a theory of
ultimate motives alone or a theory of both ultimate and interme-
diate motives. A theory of mandated motives might be a theory of
ultimate motives (for example, "Always aim to produce the great-
est good for the greatest number"), though more likely it would
be a theory of causally sufficient motives, ultimate or intermedi-
ate.38 A theory of proscribed motives usually attaches the same
consequences to these motives regardless of whether they are ul-
timate or intermediate.39 (For example, it is probably almost im-
possible to find a racist whose ultimate justification for his acts is
racial oppression as an end in itself. Most racists operate within
the same normative system, the same framework of justification,
as non-racists do. Their racism is, in other words, a species of fac-
tual or means/ends mistake,40 at least on the level at which they
38. For instance, one may construe the enumerated powers of art. I as requiring
certain motives, which motives need only be causally sufficient, not necessary or
ultimate.
If a motive is mandated, it will be so in order to bring about the effects specified
by the motive. Where the motive is absent, but the effects nonetheless are pres-
ent, no reason exists for invalidating the action. Therefore, it is most plausible to
assume that the Constitution mandates motives in areas where motives are easier
to detect than effects.
39. It is fair to characterize the motive theories of Clark and Simon as theories
of proscribed motives and as theories indifferent to whether these motives are ul-
timate or intermediate. Clark, note 8 supra; Simon, note 7 supra. Brest's antidis-
crimination principle also fits this description, as does Eisenberg's motive theory.
Brest, The Supreme Cour4 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact
and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36,
99-105 (1977).
40. Clark and Simon both supplement their proscription of certain motives with
would attempt to justify it.) Finally, although most theories of
proscribed motives will probably focus on causally necessary mo-
tives, some might focus on causally sufficient motives or even on
motives which are neither causally necessary nor causally suffi-
cient because the presence of these motives might produce spe-
cial effects beyond the particular action in question.
4 1
Motives and the State Action Problem
I have attempted elsewhere to demonstrate that although some
of the issues in "state action" cases are quite real and difficult,
the problem of state action is a bogus problem. All private actions
have legal significance in being either legally permitted, man-
dated, or prohibited; and permissive actions of a state can always
be translated into their complementary mandatory or prohibitive
actions. Consequently, there is no area of state "inaction." 2 This
position has several implications for the motive/effects contro-
versy.
First, under an effects theory, one looks at the present and pre-
dicted effects of a rule-or, more accurately, the present and pre-
dicted effects of the entire set of rules in the jurisdiction-at the
time of the constitutional challenge, not at the time of enactment.
A rule's present and predicted effects may be proper when en-
acted but improper at some later time, or vice versa.43 Therefore,
a general proscription of mistakes. However, the mistakes proscribed are factual,
means/ends mistakes, not mistakes regarding normative principles. In my opin-
ion, this is a defect in their theories. See text accompanying notes 67-71 & 86-92
infra. But see Greenwalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preferences in Law
School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 601 n.194 (1975).
43. Query: Does it ever make sense to invalidate a law because of the presence
of a proscribed motive which was not a necessary condition for the law's enact-
ment? Only when one is searching for a meta-rule in an effects theory-or when
the motive is proscribed not merely because of the laws it might produce, but also
because of the effects of social awareness of its presence--does it make sense to
invalidate a law on this ground.
42. Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help
Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975).
43. Rules are assessed for their predicted future effects on the assumption that
the rules will be relatively permanent and will not be repealed the very next day.
Officials generally are not supposed to make decisions based on facts which are
very time-bound, place-bound, or party-bound unless these facts have been deter-
mined through procedures resembling the standard judicial trial. This general pol-
icy at times has been located in the equal protection clause. Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957). But see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). It has
been located in the bills of attainder clauses. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965). But see Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Finally,
it has been located in the due process clause. K. DAvis, ADMIISTRATvE LAW OF
THE SEVENTS 241-76 (1976). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See also
L. TRmE, AmzmcAN CONSTrroNAL LAw 484-501 (1978); Alexander, Cutting the
Gordian Knot" State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
893, 916 n.66 (1975).
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because "inaction" can always be viewed as "action," or because a
challenge to permission can always be viewed as a challenge to
the permission's mandatory complements, both action and inac-
tion may be constitutional at one point in time but become uncon-
stitutional later, and vice versa.
Under a motive theory, the implication of the position that state
inaction equals state action is less straightforward. At the least,
this position means that present motives underlying either "ac-
tion" or "inaction" are always relevant.44 The fact that a rule is
enacted with proper motives should not save it when it is retained
for improper motives, whether it is retained through actual reen-
actment, through voting down a motion to repeal, or through fail-
ure even to move its repeal. Similarly, failure to enact a rule for
improper reasons should make the inaction unconstitutional from
the moment these reasons arise and become causally efficacious
to the requisite degree, whether the inaction results from voting
down a proposed action or from never proposing the action in the
first place. In short, given the same motives, it should make no
difference whether a city closes its swimming pools (as in Palmer
v. Thompson45), fails to reopen them, fails on a vote to open them
for the first time, or fails even to propose that they be opened.46
What if an action or an "inaction" was originally undertaken
with proscribed motives, but there is reason to believe the mo-
tives underlying the action or "inaction" are now proper? Some
would urge invalidating whatever actions or "inactions" were
tainted by the original proscribed motive and remanding to the
legislature to discover whether and with what motives it will re-
store the status quo ante.47 Others might attempt merely to ascer-
tain present motives and, if the motives are legitimate, overlook
the original improper ones.
Motive and Collective Bodies
A problem confronting motive theories is that of attributing mo-
tives to collective bodies when it is the rules of such bodies that
are in issue. (Effects theories also confront this problem to the
44. These motives are relevant right down to the motive behind the failure to
add as much chlorine to the public pools today as was added yesterday.
45. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
46. Of course, the evidentiary problems of attributing motives to failures to re-
peal, to enact, to propose, et cetera are staggering.
47. See L TRBE, AERICAN CoNsTrruLONAL LAW 1085-88 (1978).
extent that the meaning of the rule is a function of the motive be-
hind it.) Passage of a rule is often the result of a rather complex
institutional procedure, as, for instance, when the rule in question
is the rule of Congress or of a state legislature. Usually such a
rule is passed or repealed only if a majority of those voting in
each of two legislative houses and the chief executive officer con-
cur. Under some circumstances the improper motive of but one of
the institutional actors, if it results in deeming the actor's vote a
nullity, can lead to invalidation of a rule despite the proper mo-
tives of all the other actors-assuming it is the causal relation of
certain motives to the passage, repeal, or failure to pass or repeal
the rule which is in issue.48 .A Governor's or President's improper
motive thus could lead to invalidation of rules passed by a less
than two-thirds majority in the legislature, as could the motive of
any legislator whose vote was a "but for" cause of the outcome.
Motives underlying abstentions should in theory be relevant for
the same reason that motives behind inaction are relevant. The
major issues here are evidentiary, not conceptual, because each
theory of which motives are important and why they are impor-
tant should generate its own answers to the conceptual problems
surrounding rules produced by collective bodies. However, the ev-
identiary problems are staggering, especially when one considers
how complex is the production of a rule and how scant is the di-
rect evidence of the motives of most of the actors, and when one
keeps in mind that there is no difference in theory between enact-
ing and repealing on the one hand (action), and failing to enact or
repeal on the other (inaction).49
48. Moreover, ideally the motives behind abstentions or absences should be
considered, as well as the motives of members of the public when voting in refer-
enda.
49. Despite the evidentiary difficulties which attend attributing certain motives
to legislative inaction or "silence," it should be noted that in the area of state taxes
or state regulations impinging upon interests of national concern, such as inter.
state commerce, one theory suggests that the state laws are upheld or struck down
based upon Congress's silently expressed intent. Dowling, Interstate Commerce
and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940). Under this theory, to avoid the problem
of giving effect to "statutes" not passed through regular constitutional procedures,
account would have to be taken of the separate silent intent of the President and
both Houses of Congress. If one objects to treating silence as a "statute," one can
read the negative implications for state laws not from silence but from all the
other actions Congress has taken. In this way the "negative-inference-from-si-
lence" doctrine and the "statutory-preemption" doctrine will merge, as they do
and should in practice. A similar analysis might apply to presidential actions
taken without express congressional approval. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Motive, Effects and Standing
Why a rule is unconstitutional-whether because of its effects
or because of the motives underlying it, and which effects or
motives-should determine who has standing to challenge it in
court. Obviously, this statement reveals adherence to Professor
Albert's view of standing, namely, that standing issues are issues
of who have the rights correlative to the various legal du-
ties--constitutional, statutory, and common law.5 0 Of course, Al-
bert's view is more a conceptual aid than a formula for deciding
actual cases. Indeed, the questions of who have the rights correla-
tive to various legal duties and which of these rights are primary
rights, logically derivative rights, or instrumentally derivative
rights are among the deepest, most difficult questions in the law,
the answers to which implicate profound normative positions.5 ' It
is sufficient to state at this point that whatever view one takes of
why a rule is unconstitutional will have its own ramifications for
standing.
Motive, Effects, and Extant Judicial Doctrines
Any theory of what makes rules unconstitutional under particu-
lar constitutional provisions should attempt to account for the ju-
dicial categories and doctrines developed under the provisions,
even if only ultimately to label them aberrant or misguided. For
example, under the equal protection clause the courts refer to
suspect classifications, fundamental interests, degree of fit be-
tween classification and purpose, compelling governmental inter-
ests, and less restrictive alternatives. An effects theory of equal
protection probably would describe suspect classifications as
those suggesting that the rule will produce impermissible effects,
either because of the harmful effects which usually flow from the
classifications, the general lack of utility these classifications
have in producing permissible or mandated effects, or the motives
suggested by such classifications, which motives generally pro-
50. Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote
Relationship, 50 S. CAL L REV. 1139, 1144-54 (1978); Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J.
425 (1974).
51. Consider, for example, the model of rights (standing) suggested by Palsgraf
v. Long Island PR.P, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), and compare it with the model
suggested by the "transferred intent" cases, e.g., Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370,
59 N.W. 656 (1894).
duce rules with impermissible effects. 52 Fundamental interests
might be interests owing their significance to some other provi-
sion of the Constitution, such as the first amendment or the due
process clause, in which case their presence would suggest effects
impermissible under these provisions (or under some hybrid of
equal protection and these provisions5 3). Alternatively, they
might, if related solely to equal protection, be recast as funda-
mental inequalities. Fundamental inequalities would be those
which, because of their magnitude, their nature or their impor-
tance, suggest impermissible equal protection effects in the same
ways as do suspect classifications.54
52. For the relevance of motives in an effects theory, see text accompanying
notes 9-22 supra.
53. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Karst, Equality as a Cen-
tral Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHL L. REV. 20 (1975). Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is usually classified as such a hybrid. However, be-
cause Shapiro presumably held unconstitutional all distinctions between old and
new residents in the amounts of welfare benefits, regardless of how much new
residents had received in their states of origin, it is arguable that the case should
be classified as a pure equal protection case rather than as one in which the exer-
cise of an independent constitutional right was deterred or penalized. See
generally L, TRIBE, AmERIcA'N CONSTrrUnONAL LAW 1002-06 (1978).
54. For example, if the effects theory allows a range of governmental choices on
a continuum between libertarianism and egalitarianism, redistribution of wealth
beyond a certain level will not be mandated. However, if the government chooses
to redistribute wealth more extensively than required, but in order to save admin-
istrative costs it does not include the poor who live in remote areas, it may be
deemed to have fallen off the plane of permissible effects lying between the liber-
tarian and the egalitarian poles. For it is possible that, because the least ad-
vantaged are not benefited by the inequality, under no permissible theory of
effects would the government be able to bring about such a pattern of redis-
tribution. The same analysis might apply to the unconstitutional conditions at-
tached to "privileges" or to denial of equal provision of "privileges" on the bases of
speech, of religion, or of political affiliation. The consequences of such a position
would be that inequalities in the provision of welfare among those with equal
needs, although not inequalities in the provision of a constitutional right, are ine-
qualities of a fundamental type because they strongly imply an impermissible set
of effects. Compare Maricopa Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Department of Agriculture
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), with Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972),and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Administrative expense as a ground for
over-inclusion in a welfare program may justifiably be viewed as relevantly differ-
ent from such expense as a ground for under-inclusion. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lu-
cas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
Some inequalities are fundamental because the benefit in question must be dis-
tributed equally (for example, voting rights); others are fundamental because the
benefit, optional under the effects theory in question, is valued primarily from a
competitive perspective, and unequal provision will leave the least advantaged
under the distribution worse off than had no benefit been distributed at all. Redis-
tributions tied to skills training or to information or resources affecting political
influence, franchise access, or lawsuits between persons receiving the benefits
may, if not governed solely by equal benefits for those with equal needs, occasion
fundamental inequalities. Indeed, even unequal welfare for persons with equal
needs may leave those receiving the lesser amount worse off than had no welfare
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Once the court found a suspect classification or a fundamental
inequality, it would closely examine all the rule's relevant effects,
good and bad, in order to ascertain compliance with the ultimate
principles of proper effects. Compelling governmental interests,
factored by the degree to which they are served and discounted
by the presence of alternatives producing fewer bad effects,
would be those effects so important that they suggest compliance
with the ultimate principles even in the face of suspect classifica-
tions and fundamental inequalities. Means/purpose fit would be
irrelevant in an effects theory because actual rather than in-
tended effects are what matter, and each rule "fits" perfectly its
actual effects. 5
5
In a motive theory, suspect classifications, fundamental in-
equalities, compelling governmental interests, "fit," and less re-
strictive alternatives would all serve evidentiary functions with
respect to uncovering the motivation behind the enactment, re-
peal, or failure to enact or repeal the rule in question. Suspect
classifications would suggest certain proscribed motives. Funda-
mental inequalities would suggest the absence of a mandated mo-
tive of impartiality.5 6 Compelling governmental interests, again
been provided because the tax levies required to support welfare dry up sources
of private charity which might have been distributed more strictly on a basis of
need. Similarly, the grant of a "privilege" to Republicans but not Democrats may
be viewed less as a deterrent to joining the Democratic party than as a harm to
the Democrats by making them worse off than had neither party received the
"privilege." (Clark states that in an area where the government may exclude all
speech, the effect of excluding one point of view is not worse than the effect of
excluding all points of view. Clark, supra note 8, at 992. He clearly is mistaken.
One-sided presentations are often worse for society than no presentation by either
side.) See also L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONsTrTUToNAL LAW 1006 (1978).
55. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.
J. 123 (1972). See also Alito, Equal Protection and Classifications Based on Family
Membership, 80 Dicy. L. REV. 410, 413-14 (1976); Ely, Legislative and Administra-
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1247-48 (1970); Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Pmu- & PuB. AFF. 107, 107-08 (1976);
Shaman, The Rule of Reason in Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of
Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment of a Viable Theory of the
Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 166-67 (1975).
56. Most theories of equal protection, whether they are effects or motive theo-
ries, refer at bottom to some notion of impartiality. Effects theories test rules by
whether the effects they produce are the effects an omniscient legislature would
produce were it motivated in the requisite impartial manner. Motive theories test
rules by whether the actual motivation underlying them is impartial in the re-
quired sense.
The asserted relation of impartiality to equal protection generally takes one of
two forms: (1) There is a mandated type of impartiality, elaborated in a thor-
oughgoing normative theory. Thus, egalitarianism, Rawls's two principles of jus-
factored by the degree served and discounted by the availability
of less restrictive means, weigh against finding the prohibited mo-
tive(s). Lack of fit might also suggest impermissible purposes if
the lack of fit is between the rule and the articulated purposes.57
However, if the lack of fit is between the legislature's true pur-
poses and its rule, and the true purposes are permissible, the mo-
tive theory must be supplemented by a theory that holds some or
all legislative mistakes to be unconstitutional in order for the lack
of fit to be significant.58
SIMON'S THEORY OF MOTIVAT1ON AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
Simon posits the central meaning of the equal protection clause
to be the prohibition of racially prejudiced governmental actions.
The suspect classifications doctrine, the requirements of near-
perfect fit and compelling governmental interests whenever a
strong inference of racial prejudice is warranted, and other famil-
iar judicial constructs under the equal protection clause all func-
tion to raise and dispel the judicial inference of racial prejudice
rice, aggregative utilitarianism, aggregative utilitarianism purged of "external
preferences" (see R. DwoRKI, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232-38 (1977)), and even
libertarianism such as Nozick's can all be viewed as elaborations of the meaning
of the impartiality central to the moral point of view. (2) There is a specific, pro-
hibited type of lack of impartiality. Fiss identifies a particular effect (exacerbation
of the position of disadvantaged groups) as one specifically prohibited under the
equal protection clause for want of the requisite impartiality. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHnL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 157-59 (1976). (Fiss bases his
principle for violations of the equal protection clause either on a notion of group
rights, which I believe to be incoherent, or on more individualistic premises which
remain unstated and obscure. Moreover, given an appropriate view of state action,
Fiss's principle leads to proportional racial-group equality in the distribution of all
benefits and burdens, regardless of the desert of individuals-an impractically
rigid and morally obnoxious result.) Simon, Clark, Brest, Ely, Eisenberg and
others single out particular motives as being fatally non-impartial under the equal
protection clause. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95; Clark, note 8 supra; Ei-
senberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Mo-
tivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970); Simon, note 7 supra.
57. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HAIv. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1972). Of course, a legislature can avoid a failure of fit by
describing its purposes at a very low level of generality. See authorities cited note
55 supra. A legislature can avoid running afoul of Gunther's test by articulating
any purposes exactly fitting the rule because Gunther provides no theory of Im-
permissible purposes, although he appears to assume one. See L. TRiBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrriONAL LAw 995, 1083-85 (1978); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 (1972).
58. Simon has such a supplemental theory regarding legislative mistakes. Si-
mon, supra note 7, at 1113-14. See also note 28 supra.
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behind the action in question. 59
Simon goes further than any other modern commentator who
holds a motive theory of equal protection in specifying the pro-
scribed mental state:
Racial (or ethnic) prejudice [such as the equal protection clause pros-
cribes] is an attitude or emotion composed of two essential characteris-
tics: The group against which prejudice is directed is regarded negatively,
and this negative attitude is categorical-that is, it is directed against any-
one who is a member of the group simply because of his membership.
60
Simon describes at some length not only the phenomenology of
racial prejudice but also the two special harms attending racially
prejudiced governmental action: process distortion and dignitary
harm (insult). The remedy for the latter harm is essentially para-
sitic on the remedy for the former harm. He concludes that any
governmental action which would not have been taken "but for"
racial prejudice is invalid regardless of whether the "goal" of the
action was to disadvantage a particular racial or ethnic group.61
Putting aside the basic problem of how it corresponds to the
Framers' intentions, Simon's position has several interrelated dif-
ficulties. First, much action taken by governmental bodies and of-
ficials not caused by attitudes of racial hostility nonetheless is
based on racial stereotypes. A stereotype may be true or false,
and it may be positive, negative or neutral. Moreover, people con-
tinually act-indeed, people are required by canons of rationality
to act-on the basis of stereotypes without believing that what
holds true generally for members of a group holds true for every
individual member. Many governmental actions could be based
upon racial stereotypes-even false, negative stereotypes-which,
because they do not assume a particular attitude toward every
member of the racial group, arguably do not fit Simon's definition
of racially prejudiced action.6 2
59. The "fundamental interests" component of equal protection jurisprudence
does not fall within the framework of the analysis, and Simon apparently would
eliminate it.
60. Simon, supra note 7, at 1047.
61. Surely there are potential consequences for standing depending upon (1)
whether process distortion or dignitary harm is primary, and (2) whether only ac-
tions aimed at disadvantaging racial groups or, in addition, all actions infected
with racial prejudice violate the equal protection clause. However, Simon does not
discuss these.
62. Of course, as Simon indicates, negative racial stereotypes may reflect what
he defines as racial prejudice. Simon, supra note 7, at 1096.
For example, whites in a neighborhood into which blacks are
moving may hold a stereotype of blacks leading them to believe
that black neighbors are more likely than whites to let their prop-
erty deteriorate, or that they are more likely than whites to bring
with them an upsurge in crime, without believing that every black
who moved in would bring with him these undesirable conse-
quences. The stereotype would quite likely be false and would
surely be considered negative. But it does not appear to meet Si-
mon's stringent definition of racial prejudice.63
Simon's criteria for proscribed action thus can be interpreted as
more stringent than, for example, those of Brest, who apparently
would invalidate all actions premised on unfavorable racial (or
sexual) stereotypes, whether true or false.64 Perhaps this differ-
ence is insignificant, for Simon supplements the proscription of
actions premised on racial prejudice with a proscription of legisla-
tive mistakes.65 The latter proscription invalidates the actions
based on false racial stereotypes, leaving the problem of the ac-
tion based on a true but negative racial stereotype. Simon appar-
ently would not deem such an action unconstitutional, but he
would instead demand convincing evidence that the action was
based on a true stereotype and not on racial prejudice.66
The proscription of legislative mistakes is potentially more far-
reaching than the proscription of racially prejudiced actions.
Many rules are enacted for purposes they turn out not to serve.
These rules, according to Simon, are violative of the equal protec-
tion clause, at least until the decisionmakers adopt as their pur-
poses those in fact served by the rule.6 7 Thus, in the flag-burning
example, either the lawmakers acted with improper motives, or
they made a mistake. In either case they violated the Constitu-
tion. As Simon indicates, the proscription of mistakes, leading to a
demand for justification in terms of purposes the rule actually
63. I say "appear," because it is not entirely clear from Simon's article whether
he would regard false and negative stereotypes as tantamount to the racial
prejudice at which the equal protection clause is directed. For example, Simon
views paternalistic attitudes toward races as racial prejudice, although he does not
specify whether such attitudes must be categorical in the sense of applying to
each member of the racial group. Id., at 1095-97.
64. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Uncon-
stitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
65. Simon, supra note 7, at 1113-14.
66. Id., at 1096.
67. I believe Simon would say that these rules are unconstitutional. I have some
doubt, however, attributable to Simon's discussion of Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), where he seems to suggest that mistakes are only unconstitutional
when they become known to the decisionmakers. See Simon, supra note 7, at
1121, 1126-27. The importance of deciding whether mistakes are unconstitutional
when made or when discovered primarily relates to the retrospectivity of the rem-
edy. But see note 30 supra.
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serves, flushes out proscribed motives, and vice versa.68 However,
the truth of the matter is probably that more violations of Simon's
principles will be in the category of mistakes than in the category
of racially prejudiced actions.
Are racially prejudiced actions and mistakes all there are to
equal protection? Are there not other kinds of prejudices and ste-
reotypes that distort the legislative process? What about
prejudices against opticians,69 mental defectives, 70 nudists, or
homosexuals? Is racial prejudice meeting Simon's rather strin-
gent criteria really the most important process-distorting
prejudice among governmental officials today?
Moreover, what is the model of the undistorted decisionmaking
process (derived most likely from some normative position re-
garding effects) underlying the proscription of racial prejudice?
Perhaps, if one knew what this model were, one could decide
what other motives might be candidates for proscription. Simon
leaves one with a position under which a law producing a gross
inequality-for example, one enacted by a legislature comprised
of Benthamite utilitarians, who decide that social happiness will
be maximized by cruel treatment of blacks-is nonetheless con-
stitutional if it is well-designed to serve the legislature's purposes,
and if none of these purposes is tantamount to racial prejudice.
7 1
I believe that treating blacks in certain ways violates the equal
protection clause and thus invites judicial, not just political, rem-
edy even if it satisfies completely some non-racial principle such
as maximizing aggregate happiness.
Another difficulty with Simon's proscription of racially
prejudiced action is that it may be too strong. One way it can be
read is to forbid a decisionaker's consideration of his constitu-
ents' racial prejudices. The decisionmaker might take account of
these prejudices by seeing that the constituents' prejudiced
desires regarding governmental policy are given effect. The action
taken by the decisionmaker then is not relevantly different from
action taken directly by the constituents themselves, and the pro-
68. Simon, supra note 7, at 1113-14.
69. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
70. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
71. Locating one's basic normative principles in constitutional provisions other
than the equal protection clause does not help because, at some deep theoretical
level, it is probably impossible to separate the comparative treatment to which
equal protection is directed from the absolute treatment to which substantive due
process, freedom of speech, et cetera are directed.
scription of actions based on racial prejudice should apply. Sup-
pose, however, the decisionmaker takes account of constituents'
prejudices in attempting to keep the peace. He might, for exam-
ple, segregate prison inmates in periods of racial strife,72 or he
might assign, on a racial basis, police officers to certain neighbor-
hoods because the prejudices of those in the neighborhoods
would otherwise result in noncooperation. He might even wish to
segregate swimming pools73 or schools7 4 during times of high ra-
cial tension.75 The constituents are prejudiced, but the deci-
sionmaker is not.
Likewise, suppose a person reports a crime only because of the
race of the defendant. Is the prosecutor's action in bringing
charges a violation of the equal protection clause if he is aware
that race was a "but for" cause of the prosecution?V
6
Moreover, are there not cases where the decisionmaker should
be able to give effect to his and his constituents' racial pre-
judices? Suppose that a decisionmaker believes that he and his
constituents, all of whom are racially prejudiced, have a right to
sell their property to whomever they please. Suppose further that
their belief in such a right is a product of their racial prejudice in
a causal, though not a justificatory, sense. Should the action of
the decisionmaker in establishing a legal right to discriminate be
deemed a violation of the equal protection clause?77 Would the ac-
tion violate Simon's proscription?
Finally, suppose a decisionmaker's values, such as preferences
for certain colors and musical styles, although non-racial in them-
selves, can be traced to racial prejudices in the decisionmaker's
past or present environment. Are actions premised on these val-
ues impermissible? Simon hints that they might be.78 Without a
set of normative principles more basic than the proscription of ra-
cial prejudice in terms of which values can be assessed, the temp-
tation is strong to assess them by their ancestry. To so assess
them, however, would be to commit a particularly devastating
72. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
73. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
74. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
75. Segregation to avoid violence or other harms not only may not be racially
hostile legislative action, it may not even be appropriately deemed race-dependent
action. Only the actions of the violent private citizens, who perhaps constitute a
small minority, may be racially motivated. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 IAM.
L. REv. 70, 175 & n.77 (1977).
76. I owe this example to remarks by Professor Lane of the University of South-
ern California Law Center.
77. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), with Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
78. Simon, supra note 7, at 1062, 1121.
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form of genetic fallacy: Which of the values one holds dear can
one say with certainty are not products of some sort of tribal or
parochial prejudice?
I conclude this section with a brief comment on the way Simon
deals with the motives of collective bodies-what he labels "insti-
tutional motivation." As I read Simon, he solves the evidentiary
difficulties which attend attributing motives to institutions by
asking what the probabilities of racial prejudice would be if the
institution were but one person. He then says that the probability
of racial prejudice attributable to one-person institutions can be
attributed to each member of multi-member institutions, quod
erat demonstrandum.7 9
One difficulty, which I believe can be surmounted, exists in
such an approach. Suppose the probability of racial prejudice be-
hind a five-member school board's action is one-third, insufficient
to invalidate the action. Suppose, in addition, the action was ap-
proved by a three-to-two vote. Suppose, finally, that when the
probability that a certain motive accompanies the action of three
persons is one-third, it means that it is probable that one of the
three members acted with this motive and that the other two did
not so act. Therefore, where the vote was three to two, and the
probability of the forbidden motive was one-third, the action
would probably not have been taken but for that motive. Using Si-
mon's method, however, the action would be upheld.
An answer to this objection lies in attributing the reciprocal
probability of racial prejudice to the losing votes. Thus, if the ac-
tion of the three carries a one-third probability of racial prejudice,
the action of the two dissenters carries a two-thirds probability of
this prejudice. If one cancels out all the votes infected by racial
prejudice--one-third of three and two-thirds of two-the action
still would carry by a vote of two to two-thirds.
A more serious objection to Simon's method for attributing mo-
tives to institutional actions is that it works only so long as one
does not have evidence relating to the motives of specific mem-
bers. Once such evidence is obtained, and distinct probabilities
are available both for the institution and for some of or all its
members, the task of assessing the role of specific motives in the
actions of the institution necessarily becomes terribly complex.
79. Id., at 1097, 1101.
CLARK's THEORY OF MOTIVAT[ON AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Clark's theory of motivation is similar to Simon's, except that
Clark finds motivation to be pivotal in many if not most provi-
sions of the Constitution while Simon is silent on motive's role
outside the equal protection clause. Clark defines the "invidious
motivation" which is the key to interpreting various and sundry
constitutional doctrines as "devaluing the needs, wants, capabili-
ties, or dignity of members of a group, whether for reasons of hos-
tility or of other prejudice, on the unwarranted assumption that
such group members are less capable or less worthy of considera-
tion than other members of society."80 In other words, a legisla-
ture's mistaken8l assumption of lesser moral worth is the evil to
which various constitutional guarantees are directed. This mis-
taken assumption is an evil because it stigmatizes the individuals
so regarded and because it creates a feeling that the social con-
tract between governors and governed has been breached.82
Clark, like Simon, views many of the familiar judicial doctrines
as performing an evidentiary function in the judicial search for
proscribed motivation. Thus, suspect classes, fundamental inter-
ests, and compelling governmental interests are significant be-
cause of their strong implication or negation of improper mo-
tives. 83 Moreover, Clark goes beyond Simon in positing not only
an evidentiary function for specific constitutional categories of
rules and interests but also a per se rule function for many of
these categories, at least in areas outside pure equal protection.
Thus, because of institutional limitations in uncovering the true
motives of decisionmakers, certain categories of rules are conclu-
sively presumed to be violative of various constitutional guaran-
tees as a prophylactic against time-consuming and usually uncon-
vincing pleas of proper motivation.84
Clark briefly takes on the issue of negative stereotypes versus
prejudices.85 He recognizes that some judgments of lesser worth
may be justified (for example, those retributive judgments di-
rected at certain lawbreakers). But he also recognizes that deci-
sionmakers from time to time and in limited contexts may desire
80. Clark, supra note 8, at 966-67.
81. Clark indicates that a mistaken assumption of lesser moral worth is not less
pernicious because it is honest. Id., at 965-66. Furthermore, he indicates that if a
mistaken assumption of lesser moral worth is one premise underlying a rule, the
rule is no less an evil merely because the legislature's ultimate purpose is permis-
sible. Thus, Clark's position is that the Constitution invalidates a particular type of
legislative mistake, namely, a mistake regarding moral worth.
82. Id., at 954, 964, 967.
83. Id., at 954, 975-76.
84. Id., at 976, 983.
85. Id., at 972-73.
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to act on negative stereotypes which they recognize do not hold
true for all members of the affected group and do not necessarily
warrant other kinds of actions affecting the group. But he avoids
the issue of when negative stereotypes justifiably can result in
prejudgment and when such prejudgment is proscribed prejudice.
Clark, again like Simon, supplements his motive theory with a
proscription of legislative mistakes, though the proscription
seems less a matter of regarding laws enacted by mistake as un-
constitutional per se than a matter of smoking out improper mo-
tives by precluding a claim of mistake.86 Thus, mistakes in areas
where improper motives are unlikely may not be unconstitutional
for Clark, whereas for Simon such mistakes are unconstitutional
though almost totally impossible to detect.
One difficulty with Clark's general position is similar to a diffi-
culty with Simon's, except that it is more serious given Clark's de-
sire to relate a certain proscribed set of motives to almost all
significant constitutional guarantees. The difficulty lies in Clark's
failure to provide a positive model of what counts as an impartial
motivation. I agree that a legislative view of blacks or Republicans
or Vermonters as human beings of lesser worth displays a lack of
impartiality that is morally and constitutionally significant-but I
do so because I have in mind a definite model of what impartial-
ity looks like. Clark appears to remain neutral among the various
conceptions of impartiality endorsed by egalitarians, Rawlsians,
utilitarians of various stripes, or libertarians.87
The consequence of Clark's failure to provide a specific concep-
tion of impartiality is that his attempt to reduce practically every-
thing of constitutional significance to a few proscribed motives is
terribly strained. For example, with respect to the various first
amendment areas-libel, commercial speech, neutrally-worded
time, place, and manner restrictions, and so forth-Clark stretch-
es either the notion or relevance of prejudice against certain
groups. Clark states that the selectivity employed by the city re-
garding plays in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad88 evi-
denced proscribed prejudice because "the city made the
judgment that the play was not fit for the adult public to see."89 If
86. Id., at 983-84.
87. See note 56 supra.
88. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
89. Clark, supra note 8, at 1020. Compare this view of "prejudice" with Clark's
basic definition. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
this type of prejudice represents the prejudice proscribed by the
first amendment, then so too does the type of "prejudice" dis-
played in banning certain commercial advertisements, to which
Clark does not object.SO Perhaps the notion of prejudice or its rel-
evance seems strained because it is not clear in what sense a gov-
ernment must view all ideas, like races or sexes, as of equal
worth. Even more than in the equal protection area, the omission
of some general theory of the first amendment, framed in terms of
some set of effects or in terms of the motives to bring about this
set of effects, undermines the usefulness of Clark's analysis.9 1 I
cannot tell whether for Clark a dispassionate (and obviously non-
Millian) utilitarian, for example, who suppresses speech, but only
when necessary to maximize aggregate happiness, would be en-
gaging in "invidious" (read "violative of the first amendment")
suppression.9 2
Finally, Clark's attempt to disengage unconstitutionality from
motivation at the border of state action is unconvincing. As I
stated earlier and elsewhere,9 3 at bottom no coherent distinction
can be drawn between state "action" and "inaction," because the
latter can always be recast as the former. However, it does not fol-
low from the fact that state action is a concept devoid of analyti-
cal significance that private racial discrimination, for example,
cannot constitutionally be allowed. All that follows is that its al-
lowance is state action of a particular type. State action therefore
cannot provide the baseline beyond which motivation ceases to
impugn action.
90. Clark, supra note 8, at 1001-03. I do not deny that the criteria of selection
that the government might employ in situations where it must perforce be selec-
tive-for example, in choosing the public school's curriculum, the public library's
books, and the public auditorium's plays-may violate the first amendment. In-
deed, I believe the contrary is true, although I find it immensely difficult to iden-
tify which criteria would and would not be impermissible in these areas. However,
it is not in the suppression of unpopular views wherein lies the distinction, if any,
between commercial speech and plays. Both forms of speech may be suppressed
for the same reasons, some proper, some improper. See also Alexander, Speech in
the Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. for Local Regulatory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO
I. REV. 357, 375-76 (1977).
91. For examples of comprehensive theories of the first amendment, see the
first amendment works cited in Alexander, The Province of Constitutional Law
Casebook Jurisprudence Redetermined, 29 STAN. L REV. 1299, 1306 n.25 (1977). See
also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech. An Inquiry into the Sub-
stance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978).
92. For a similar point, see Bice, Motivation Analysis as a Complete Explana-
tion of the Justification Process, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1138-39 (1978).
93. See Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help
Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975); text accompanying note 42
supra.
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The concept of a baseline, however, can be of use in constitu-
tional law. The baseline could represent a set of effects-or the
corresponding motive to produce such a set of effects-marking
the terminus of the range of effects the provision in question al-
lows. One would identify this baseline by inference from the nor-
mative principles the provision deems acceptable. Movement
away from the baseline in the direction of another terminus
would be permissible, but not mandatory; and the principles
might, for example, permit a fair amount of governmental tolera-
tion of private discrimination and even mandate protection of
some private discrimination.
To say the government may move between one baseline set of
effects and another is not to say that its motivation for picking a
nonmandated but permitted set of effects is irrelevant. Quite the
contrary is the case, and I refer the reader to the earlier discus-
sion of the role of motivation in an effects theory.94 It is in fact
only when effects are permitted but not mandated by the Consti-
tution itself or by the judiciary that motive is relevant. And de-
spite what Clark says, it is no more difficult to assess motivation
in the area of permissible effects than it is elsewhere. 95
94. See notes 9-22 and accompanying text supra.
95. Clark states, for example, that it is very difficult to infer improper motiva-
tion when a town terminates a nonmandated service such as public swimming
pools, and he states that this is one reason for not deeming these terminations un-
constitutional. Clark, supra note 8, at 1013-14. However, he also states that motive
is relevant to the constitutionality of facially neutral anti-litter laws and that the
possibility of improper motive justifies prophylactic rules forbidding application of
such laws except in certain circumstances. Id., at 1010-11. Clark's grounds for dis-
tinguishing the termination of services from the anti-litter laws are problematic,
for in terms of ease of proof of motivation, the termination of services and the anti-
litter laws appear indistinguishable. Clark offers no theory of mandated and per-
missible effects which would otherwise distinguish them.

